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NOTES ON THE MIDDLE EAST
Self-Determination in International Law:
The Palestinians
by John A. Collins*
I. INTRODUCTION
[Tihe Arab in Palestine has the right to self-determination. This
right is not limited, and cannot be qualified by our own interests. . . It
is possible that the realization of the aspirations (of the Palestinian




T HE PRINCIPLE OR concept of self-determination, as a theoretical
term, has long been loosely bandied about within the international
community. In practice, self-determination* has often been the battle cry
of oppressed peoples seeking to rule their own destiny. Indeed, the mix
between theoretical self-determination and realpolitik self-determination
often resembles that of oil and water: the thin layer of theory floats on
top - and often disguises - the vast depths of realpolitik considerations.
Espousals of self-determination have been loudly proclaimed
throughout the world. Yet, this hyphenated word remains ambiguous.
This paper will focus on the term and analyze it within the framework of
the Palestinian problem. At the outset it should be noted that general
international acceptance of self-determination is often hampered by
problems of definition, implementation, limitation and enforcement.
Thus, in examining the population and land of Palestine2 and concluding
in favor of Palestinian self-determination, a balance shall be struck be-
*J.D. candidate 1981, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Lecture by David Ben Gurion (Berlin, 1931), excerpted in Rouleau, The Palestinian
Quest, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 264, 266 (1975)
2 The geographical description of Palestine appears in the text accompanying note 95
infra.
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tween the theoretical and realpolitik sides of self-determination. Without
this balance, there can be no Middle East peace. For the Palestinians,
" . . . the cause of their violence is the revolting injustice of which they
are the victims. So long as this injustice subsists, violence is bound to
continue."3
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Nationalism
The first expression of self-determination as a political concept has
not been clearly dated. The German word for self-determination,
Selbstbestimmungsrecht, appeared in a 1896 resolution of the London In-
ternational Socialist Congress.4 Moreover, the German Declaration of
Rights of 1848 reflected self-determination principles based on nationalis-
tic and democratic principles.5 These documents reveal an emphasis on
the sovereign independence of nations rather than the rights of a people.8
The equating of national sovereignty with self-determination undoubt-
edly stems from the strong nationalistic consciousness of the nineteenth
century.
As a term of art, self-determination is not easily defined. Although
the nineteenth century notion was a nationalistic, state-sovereignty form
of self-determination, the modern view of self-determination is less re-
strictive. The wealth of twentieth century treatises and documents sug-
gests that self-determination is a collective right of a people sharing simi-
lar objective characteristics to freely determine their form of government
while further developing their economic, social and cultural status.7 This
definition steps away from national sovereignty notions and assigns the
right of self-determination to a people. This assignment more accurately
reflects what many believe to be the true roots of modern self-determina-
tion: The American and French Revolutions.8
3 H. CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (1973).
' U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1972).
1 A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 45 (1969).
6 Id.; UMOZURIKE, supra note 4, at 3.
1 See, e.g., art. 1, para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); art. 1, para. 1,
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6319 (1966).
8 Writers differ as to when self-determination was first expressed. For those favoring
the French Revolution as the first such expression, see R. BUELL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
32 (rev. ed. 1929); Woolsey, Self-Determination, 13 Am.J. INT'L. L. 302 (1919). For writers
suggesting that the American Revolution was the first manifestation of self-determination
principles, see Toynbee, Self-Determination. Q. REV. (London) April 1925, at 317; Barbour,
The Concept of Self-Determination in American Thought, 32 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 576




The American Revolution was an attempt to remove the yoke of
British rule from the colonies. As evidenced by the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, colonial political theorists, especially Thomas Jefferson, were
heavily inculcated in the natural law philosophies of John Locke. Thus,
both Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence could assertively
state " . . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive
of these ends [securing life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness], it is the
right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new
government."'
Some fifteen years later, France's third estate of commoners drew
heavily from the Lockean-based writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau in
overthrowing the Bourbon Monarchy and establishing the First Republic.
The dissolution of France's tripartite society was heralded by the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Declaration des dr6it de
l'homme et citoyen): "All men were born and remain equal in rights."10
While both the American and French Revolutions acknowledged the
natural law rights of the people, their expressions of self-determination
principles differ from the modern expression. As Alfred Cobban observed,
"[T]hen it had been a simple corollary of democracy."" For colonists and
commoners, self-determination meant democracy. Today self-determina-
tion must be read more broadly to allow a people to choose their own
governmental status - whether democracy, monarchy, or theocracy.
C. World War I
The self-determination doctrine emerged from the revolutions of the
late eighteenth century to face the rigorous demands of nineteenth cen-
tury nationalism. The twentieth century and the two world wars brought
the seeds of self-determination to full bloom. The waste and carnage of
W.W.I presented world leaders with a clear view of the dangers of nation-
alism. The threat and danger of a "world" war, then as now, advanced the
acceptance of modern self-determination principles as international law.12
Thus, self-determination concepts were applied to Europe and the Otto-
man Empire by the Allies and the League of Nations. Poland and Czech-
oslovakia, two non-sovereign territories prior to the War, declared their
independence in 1918 upon nationality grounds.'3 Article 22 of the
9 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 103 (H. Commanger ed. 1948).
o UMozuRIKE, supra note 4, at 10.
COBBAN, supra note 5, at 114.
12 See W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 183 (1977).
" Poland declared its independence on November 11, 1918 and the Republic of Czech-
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League of Nations Covenant called for advanced nations to act as
Mandatories over specified colonies and territories which were then inca-
pable of self-rule.14 Self-determination, though still theoretically based,
was gaining acceptance out of necessity-the necessity of meeting the
"strenuous conditions of the modern world."' 5
Many states and organizations accept self-determination as a basic
principle of international law. President Woodrow Wilson is generally
given credit for its acceptance by the Allies and the League of Nations. As
Wilson noted, "self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an impera-
tive principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their
peril."' Yet Wilson's espousal and the subsequent Allied approval of self-
determination, must not be blithely accepted. Wilson's words do not
come from his famous Fourteen Points, but from the preamble to his
Four Supplementary Points17 presented on February 11, 1918. His state-
ment must be considered as a partial response to the signing of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty on November 8, 1917. This treaty separated huge areas
from Russia on the principle of nationality. Though German troops
shortly dispelled any thoughts of self-determination in these areas, none-
theless, the treaty must be seen as a catalyst which focused Allied eyes
upon the principle of self-determination.
The Bolshevik adoption of self-determination was incorporated into
the Soviet Constitution of 1936.18 However, this incorporation must be
tempered by the realization that, "[s]elf-determination is not an absolute
right but is subject to the dictatorship of the proletariat."' 9 Thus the
rights of the working class are superior to the right of self-determination.
The right of self-determination is thereby limited by the Soviet govern-
ment's perception as to when the workers' rights are being infringed. Sim-
ilarly, the denial of self-determination in Afghanistan in January 1980
would thus be predicated on the need "to defend the power of the work-
ing class."' 0
oslovakia came into existence on October 30, 1918. For a comparison between the Poles,
Czechs, and Palestinians, see Comment, Standing Before the International Court of Jus-
tice, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L. L.J. 454, 467 (1977).
,1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 2.
Id. at para. 1.
Speech of Woodrow Wilson (February 11, 1918), reprinted in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR & PEACE 180 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds. 1927).
,7 See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 72.
, See UMOZURIKE, supra note 4, at 272. This concept wes earlier adopted by the Bol-
sheviks on November 15, 1917 in the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, see
Laserson, The Development of Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe 1917-1942, in 1943 INT'L
CONCILIATION 5, 11.
'9 UMOZURIKE, supra note 4, at 167.
'0 J. STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION 168 (1936), quoted in
UMOZURIKE, supra note 4, at 167.
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The Soviet Union has not stood alone in constitutionally adopting
the principle of self-determination. France (1958), the Congo (1963) and
the Central African Republic (1962) have all incorporated the doctrine
into their constitutions." Even Adolf Hitler extolled the value of national
self-determination. For Hitler, though, nationalism was the controlling
factor. Hitler was able to use "the principle of national self-determination
in order to disguise and justify his policies of territorial expansion."2 2
D. United Nations
World War II and the formation of the United Nations provided the
springboard necessary to bring self-determination to the forefront of in-
ternational law. The destruction and fears resulting from World War II,
as with World War I, did much to advance the principle of self-determi-
nation, Here again, the necessity factor - survival - propelled the no-
tion of self-determination into the world's consciousness. Thereafter the
United Nations and its Charter further defined and developed the
concept.
The U.N. Charter provides that relations among nations should be
"based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples. '2 3 The simple existence of this principle within the U.N.
Charter suggests its recognition as a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law. Each U.N. member also pledges to support the principle of
self-determination. The problem arises in distinguishing between a prin-
ciple and a right. As some have suggested, the principle of self-determina-
tion does not imply that a certain people have a right of self-determina-
tion.2 4 Indeed, one author notes that self-determination was not even a
defined right in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 5 What
these authors fail to account for, however, is the effect of subsequent U.N.
Resolutions on the subject of self-determination.
"' See UMozuRIKE, supra note 4, at 272, which also notes that the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty (1953), the Franco-Algerian Treaty of Evian (1962) and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) recognize self-determination.
22 Schoenberg, Limits of Self-Determination, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 99
(1976).
23 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Similarly, Article 56 provides that "all members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization to the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." The purposes included in Article 55
foresee the creation of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
on equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
, The authors thus claim that a "principle" and not a "right" is recognized in interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Mustafa, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, 5
INT'L LAW. 479, 480 (1971); Emerson, Self-Determination, 60 Proc.AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 135,
136 (1966); Note, Toward Self-Determination: A Reappraisal As Reflected in the Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & Coup. L. 145, 157 (1973).
22 Mustafa, supra note 24, at 480.
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The principle of self-determination proclaimed in Articles 1 and 55
of the U.N. Charter has now become an internationally recognized legal
right. Perhaps a distinction can still be made between "right" and "prin-
ciple". Self-determination is an acknowledged "principle" of international
law. It is the composite elements of this principle which have become
"rights." Thus a collective group has a right to freely choose a form of
government while further developing their social, economic and cultural
status. Self-determination is a principle of international law but it is also
a right to be compared with those of self-defense and non-intervention."s
Post-1948 U.N. Resolutions lend credence to the above argument.
Most significantly, three Resolutions seem to bear this out. The 1960 Res-
olution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples,27 the 1966 Covenants on Political and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,2 and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 29 all acknowl-
edge the existence of the "right" of self-determination by which peoples
may freely pursue their economic, social, cultural and political
development.
Thus, despite contrary claims, 0 the pre-United Nations principle or
theory of self-determination has matured into a full-fledged, recognized
right in international law. U.N. practice as well as the aforementioned
treaties and constitutions support this view. Moreover, support is also
found in the world's post-W.W. II anti-colonial trend and in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
In 1954, Quincy Wright observed that of the eighty-three nations of
the world, only nineteen had a continuous existence longer than that of
the United States.81 Since its inception, the U.N. has witnessed the
decolonization of some seventy territories through the world.3 2 These sta-
tistics reveal not merely an anti-colonial trend, but more importantly, an
international acceptance of the principle and right of self-determination.
The International Court of Justice also acknowledges this right. In its
268 See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 150; 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 181-182 (1966).
27 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7.
29 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
20 Note, supra note 24, at 157, suggests that the principle of self-determination has not
become an internationally recognized legal right. Others find international acceptance of the
right of self-determination, see ASAMOAH, supra note 26, at 177ff; H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETER-
MINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 41ff (1967); Wright, Recognition and Self-
determination, 48 PROC. Am. SoC'Y INT'L L. 23, 29 (1954).
2 Wright, supra note 30, at 25.
32 OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 186.
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1975 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, the Court states that devel-
opments in international law during the past fifty years indicate general
acceptance of self-determination as a recognized international right.3 In
theory, then, self-determination has evolved into an accepted legal right.
Yet whether the evolutionary process is dated at 200 years, or whether
arguments continue over "principle" versus "right," one must remember
that the arguments are always subject to realpolitik considerations.
These practical or realpolitik considerations all reflect problems of
theoretical self-determination. Thus, earlier claims of worldwide accept-
ance of self-determination are challenged by questions of sovereignty.
Each state is composed of minority groups. To allow each group an un-
qualified right of self-determination would cause the dismemberment of
almost every nation. No state or organization can be expected to go to
that extent in accepting the principle of self-determination.
Despite the claim that self-determination has become a recognized
international right,' the fact remains that self-determination may need
brute force behind its implementation. Often the issue is not whether a
group deserves self-determination but "whether it has the political
strength, which may well mean the military force, to validate its claim."35
Without might, the enforcement of self-determination legally or politi-
cally may prove difficult.
Thus, realpolitik considerations cannot be ignored. To do so only
leads to definitional and enforcement problems concerning self-determi-
nation. Having dealt with the historical development and acceptance of
self-determination, it is best to further expound on the actual, practical
problems of self-determination.
III. THE PROBLEMS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Definitions
An inherent problem with the principle of self-determination is that
it is a principle of international law. As with other international princi-
ples, self-determination is not easily defined. Those opposed to the con-
cept of self-determination have described it as "legally intangible, ambig-
uous, problematical, and only partially applicable . . . (such) that self-
determination is in practice unnecessary and invalid."36 Even supporters
of the concept fear that the conditions of the world prevent any nation or
people from truly determining its own destiny; from exercising its right of
:1 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 32.
S4 Id.
31 Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM.J.INT'L L. 459, 475 (1971).
11 I. BiBo, THE PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND REMEDIES 33 (1976).
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
self-determination.3 7 More succinctly, few can arrive at a standard defini-
tion of self-determination. This note's earlier attempt to define self-deter-
mination was merely to lay a rudimentary foundation. Thus, most defini-
tions include the right of a people to determine its social, political,
economic and cultural status. Requirements of sovereignty8 and specific
types of self-determination 9 have often entered the equation. For the
purposes of this paper, the earlier, workable definition will stand.
Perhaps the most crucial point in understanding the concept of self-
determination is that the concept should not be abandoned simply be-
cause it lacks a precise, internationally-agreed-upon definition. Many in-
ternational principles have different definitional interpretations. The
United States, for example, finds Soviet treatment of Jews to be violative
of human rights. The USSR sees unemployment in the United States as
violating human rights. Each nation's interpretation differs as to what are
human rights. Such is the case with defining self~determination.
The Western nations, despite the lack of a standard definition, have
come to accept self-determination as a principle of international law.40
The concept should be accepted not on the basis of the political philoso-
phy of different treatise writers but by its practice in the modern world.
Nations and not writers determine what is international law. Terms such
as "self-determination" and "peoples" are best defined by international
practice and consensus. Hence, definitions of "peoples" and "nationality"
will not be found in books but rather in describing the "essence" of
groups that have achieved self-determination. 41
Two case studies emphasize this point. The states of Rwanda and
Burundi lie in Africa between Zaire and Tanzania. Both gained their in-
dependence in 1962 after a U.N. election showed that the people in the
territory of Ruanda-Urundi desired the formation of two separate
states.42 Though the General Assembly originally desired one unified
state,43 the wishes of the inhabitants were granted and two states were
formed. Bangladesh, on the other hand, sought to achieve self-determina-
tion without the backing of world opinion. Most nations saw the problem
3' COBBAN, supra note 5, at 301, thus suggests that a nation's sovereignty and indepen-
dence is directly related to its military and economic power.
38 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 460.
"I See, e.g., UMOZURIK, supra note 4, at 3.
40 Id. at 179.
4' Thus a priori definitions are tempered by realpolitik considerations. See OFUATEY-
KODJOE, supra note 12, at 151.
4' For further inquiry into the case of Ruanda-Urundi, see A. Rico SUREDA, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 50-52 (1973). Actual election results ap-
pear in, JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 209 app.
" See G.A. Res. 1579, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 34, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); G.A. Res. 1605, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A) 8, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add. 1.
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as one of internal civil war to be solved by Pakistani authorities. Ban-
gladesh was forced to win its independence not by a worldwide accept-
ance of its right of self-determination, but by the strength of its people
and India's military force.4" Whether this struggle is classified as seces-
sion or self-determination is irrelevant; Bangladesh has, and will suffer
for years to come.
The above examples indicate that international opinion plays a role
in defining "self-determination," "people," and who is and is not ready
to achieve self-determination. Lack of world support caused Bangladesh's
self-determination struggle to be far different than that of Rwanda and
Burundi. The study also reveals the problem with standard definitions.
Bangladesh received little international support45 and it still achieved
self-rule. Yet if international practice sets the definition for self-determi-
nation, a lack of international approval suggests that Bangladesh's strug-
gle should have failed. Perhaps this further explains why any definition of
self-determination is but a "working" one subject to the exigencies of the
modern world. The definition must remain flexible and adaptable to vary-
ing conditions because of inherent problems such as implementation and
enforcement.
B. Implementation and Enforcement
The problems of implementation and enforcement directly challenge
theoretical self-determination with the realities of modern life. The deter-
mination of when a group is ready or ripe for self-determination will be a
subject of later discussion. Presently, an examination must be made of
the corollary question of how it is to be decided when a group is ready.
Two schools of thought - objective and subjective - focus on differ-
ent factors in determining when a group is ready to achieve self-determi-
nation. Both schools will be dealt with more fully in examining the
"when" question. Briefly, the subjective school examines the will of the
people as the primary factor in evaluating self-determination claims. The
objective school views characteristics such as race, religion, and language
in making a similar analysis. The distinction made is significant in terms
of implementation. The subjective school uses elections, plebiscites or
commissions to ascertain the will of the people. Empirical data concern-
ing race, language and religion provides the implementation base for the
objective school. Both schools then point to their implementation devices
- plebiscites or data - as a later means of showing when a group is ripe
for self-determination.
1, OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 12, at 144.
15 Id. Only India, Chile, Sweden, Madagascar and the Soviet-bloc nations supported
Bangladesh's struggle.
1980
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The problem, however, is that the determination of when a people
have legitimate self-determination claims should not be strictly subjective
or objective. Rather, a mix of the two would seem more appropriate. The
examination of the will or wishes (subjective) of a people sharing similar
language, racial and religious bonds (objective) would be the most effec-
tive and strongest implementation method. The U.N. and other organiza-
tions and nations,46 have conducted plebiscites and elections to determine
the will of the people. The election in Ruanda-Urundi is a case in point.
The problem with plebiscites, aside from the establishment of residency
requirements and determining voting eligibility,47 is that the plebiscite
can only be used to determine the will of the people and not the "nature
or size of the group that is to be consulted. ' 4' Essentially then, "the peo-
ple cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are.' 49
The best implementation method to evaluate the desire for achieve-
ment of self-determination is a combination of subjective plebiscites with
objective data. The practical realities, though, reveal that military might
may be the true key for implementing and enforcing self-determination
claims. The International Court of Justice and U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions may proclaim self-determination as an internationally recog-
nized right.50 International law and its organizational supporters, how-
ever, are generally powerless to enforce even basic principles of interna-
tional law. U.N. principles and resolutions are often ignored and blatantly
contradicted. 1
Any realpolitik, practical conclusion therefore must recognize that
the methods of implementing self-determination claims and the means of
enforcing these claims rest upon two factors. First, as seen with Rwanda
and Burundi, the implementation and enforcement of self-determination
may rest upon international good will and acceptance. 2 Second, Ban-
46 JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 72-81, presents detailed charts depicting various plebi-
scites or elections and their results. The recognized authority in the plebiscite field is Sarah
Wambaugh; see S. WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES (1920); S. WAMBAUGH, PLEBI-
SCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR (1933).
17 These practical problems are discussed in WAMBAUGH, A. MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES
32-33 (1920).
" OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 35.
4 SIR IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, quoted in OFUATEY-
KODJOE, supra note 12, at 35.
50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7; Declaration on The
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 27; Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra note 29; Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, supra note 33.
", Panel: Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 PROC.
Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 31, 55 (Comments of L.C. Green).
2 As Schoenberg, supra note 22, at 91, observes: "Specifically which groups are allowed
self-determination is decided by the configurations of power and interest between dominant
and oppressed groups and between competing states."
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gladesh graphically illustrates that military muscle may be the only
means of implementation and enforcement when international approval is
non-existent. Good will and force thus seem to be the bywords of self-
determination. Before turning to consider "when" self-determination is to
be achieved by "what" people, the conceptual relationship between self-
determination and secession should be discussed.
C. Secession
The very existence of a principle of self-determination questions the
traditional view of absolute state sovereignty. The argument that self-de-
termination is simply a byword for revolution has often been made.53
Nonetheless, the fact that self-determination is a revolutionary proposal
does not render it an inherently evil proposal if properly limited. The
nineteenth century witnessed violent revolutions based on nationalistic
self-determination principles.5 A new age dawned with the twentieth
century's acceptance of changing international law. The danger of world
wars helped foster acceptance of an international law principle of self-
determination. In accepting self-determination in the post W.W. II anti-
colonial era, the world approved the revolutionary notion of colonies cut-
ting the ties to their present or former master. 5 The creation of seventy
new nations since the establishment of the U.N. emphasizes this point.
Self-determination is a revolutionary proposal - but in a positive
sense. For unlike the nineteenth century nationalistic self-determination,
modern self-determination actually promotes peace. This may seem
counter-intuitive. Does not the very principle suggest subversion and dis-
ruption? "Indeed, is there not a danger that the right of self-determina-
tion, brought to its extreme conclusions... may not turn into its own
negation!"' 6 Such a danger is effectively neutralized by realizing that, as
with any principle of international law, self-determination has its limits.
The aforementioned objective and subjective considerations are impor-
tant limits. Perhaps the greatest limit on self-determination is found in
recognizing the limits on a people's right of secession. Secession involves
a group or people breaking away from an established state. Such a right is
dependent upon the group's ability to satisfy subjective and objective
considerations, and to mobilize military might and gain international ap-
proval. Thus the exclusion of secessionist minority groups from the class
53 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 24, at 135.
"Traditional self-determination was invariably marked by violent conflict, see
Toynbee, supra note 8, at 323.
"5 "However, any attempt on the part of a repressed minority to break away from an
established policy is still considered to be a revolutionary act." Friedlander, Self-Determi-
nation: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 71, 89.
11 D. NINcIc, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 252-253 (1970).
NOTES1980
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of people able to claim the right of self-determination is another major
limit on the right of self-determination.
Though it is true that a process exists "whereby self-determination
evolves into sovereignty, '57 the extension of self-determination rights to
all secessionist groups would clearly be anti-state sovereignty. Though the
Soviet Union grants the right to secede to each of its republics, it also
recognizes that secession is incompatible with its basic military and eco-
nomic interests.58 Therefore, this right to secede is actually and always
subservient to the dictatorship of the proletariat although it is useful as a
propaganda weapon.59
Russia is not alone in recognizing the problems of secession. Both
former U.N. Secretary General U Thant6 ° and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU)6 1 specifically reject secession in favor of state sovereignty
and integrity, although they are supportive of self-determination rights.
Though Articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter acknowledge the princi-
ple of self-determination, this acknowledgement must be balanced by the
U.N. members' respect for the sovereign integrity of other nations. De-
spite U.N. committee reports that self-determination does not extend to
all secessionist groups, 62 some states are simply afraid to accept the prin-
ciple out of fear that the right of self-determination might be equated
with the right to secede. s
Realistically speaking, states and nations simply will not endorse se-
cession as an integral part of the right of self-determination. To do so
would threaten, if not destroy, their very existence. Had the United
States accepted a right to secede in the mid-eighteenth century, its char-
acter would have been drastically altered and its existence arguably
threatened. An international recognition of the right of secession would
surely cause international chaos. The relationship between human rights
and self-determination might suggest that the right of self-determination
also be extended to ethnic minorities. 4 However, unless these ethnic mi-
norities can fulfill the various requirements necessary to achieve self-de-
termination, the states cannot legitimately be expected to support their
claims. These requirements, of course, deal with the ensuing problems of
57 Id. at 257.
" See COBBAN, supra note 5, at 197-198.
'" See UMOZURIKE, supra note 4, at 167.
60 See 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Feb. 1970, at 36.
6, See Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AM.J. INT'L L. 321, 327
(1972).
62 See Doe. 343, 1/1/16, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 296 (1945).
63 Iraq and Iran, for example, have specifically rejected the self-determination = seces-
sion equation. See, respectively, 10 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (671st mtg.) 233, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.
671 (1955); 13 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (888th mtg.) 257, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 888 (1958).
6 Such a suggestion was raised and dispensed with in OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12,




objective as opposed to subjective determinations of a people, the ques-
tion of readiness or ripeness of a people and other inherent limitations
placed upon the right of self-determination.
D. Achievement and Limitations
The problems of definition, implementation, enforcement and seces-
sion have all briefly touched on when a people are entitled to self-deter-
mination. This section makes a more in-depth examination of "when" a
people are ripe for self-determination.
As noted earlier, although the implementation stage of self-determi-
nation may involve plebiscites and empirical data, the actual achievement
of self-determination relies on universal good will or military might. The-
oretically, the United Nations makes the determination of when a group
is ready to exercise its right of self-determination. By working from the
premise that the U.N. can establish criteria to determine whether or not a
territory is self-governing, 65 the General Assembly has defined both the
people entitled to self-determination and the manner of achieving that
right.6  The General Assembly has even asserted that it alone determines
when a people emerge from a non-self-governing status to one of self-
rule.6 7 Thus the General Assembly in 1969 recognized the existence of a
Palestinian people68 and subsequently declared and reaffirmed their right
of self-determination. 9
In reality, many peoples claiming the right of self-determination may
never receive or may be unable to wait for U.N. support. The people
themselves may determine that they are ready for self-rule and the test of
readiness may well prove to be military force. Moreover, as observed ear-
lier, U.N. resolutions are easily ignored: the Palestinians' plight is a case
in point.
Though the United Nations may set criteria for achieving self-deter-
mination, the fundamental standards still revolve around the subjective
e' See G.A. Res. 334, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 43 (1949).
See notes 27-28 supra; G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR; Supp. (No. 16) 29; U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960); G.A. Res. 1542, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
" G.A. Res. 637, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 26, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); G.A. Res.
648, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 31, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953); G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 66.
U G.A. Res. 2535B, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/7363 (1969).
" G.A. Res. 2649, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 73, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A.
Res. 2672B, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 35, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2787, 26
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2792 D, 26 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 29) 47, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2963 C-E, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
30) 28, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3089D, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 27, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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and objective schools of thought. That is, what are the composite ele-
ments of "self' in self-determination. Is "self' to be viewed objectively
(race, religion, language) or subjectively (will of the people)? It was ear-
lier suggested that people with common objective traits must subjectively
feel they are a unified people. In defining "self', pure objective or subjec-
tive standards are inadequate. Yet problems exist even when the stan-
dards are merged. For example, objectively, the American colonists dif-
fered only slightly from their English counterparts but subjectively they
declared themselves to be a separate people.7 0
How many objective factors characterize a people? Are similar race,
language and culture sufficient, or must one also look for religious, histor-
ical and geographic ties? What of population requirements? Is, as Hitler
suggested, a state of six million people too small to constitute a people
entitled to self-determination? 71 The above questions demonstrate that a
mere checklist of objective factors in evaluating self-determination claims
cannot suffice. What is required are "elements of group identity . . .
which give rise to a parochial sentiment and which are thus likely to pro-
duce government based on consent."72 Thus it is that the people properly
ready to exercise their self-determination right share similar characteris-
tics and traits and see themselves as one people, one community.
There are, of course, limitations on the right of self-determination.
Self-determination does not and cannot apply to secessionist groups. 73 To
allow such groups to invoke a right of self-determination would create a
state of constant international instability. Self-determination would feed
upon itself and bring actual anarchy rather than true self-determination.
Another valid limitation on the right of self-determination is that a
group, a people, must exercise the right as a collective concept. 4 Though
individuals may act for the collective group in pursuing self-determina-
tion goals, the right remains collective in nature. Self-determination may
be comparable to other "individual" human rights and may be deemed to
be an aggregation of these individual rights. Common sense suggests,
however, that were an individual to be given the right of self-determina-
tion, attempts to exercise this right would again promote anarchy. Only
individuals acting on behalf of the collective group promote self-determi-
nation. For the sake of the community - the essence of the "social con-
tract" - the right of self-determination must be confined to the collec-
tive people.
70 See L. BUCHHEIT, SECCESSION 11 (1978).
7' Hitler further suggested that "to-day it is only under quite peculiar presuppositions
that such small state formations can have a possibility of life." 2 N. BAYNES, THE SPEECHES
OF ADOLF HITLER, APRIL 1922-AuousT 1939, at 1437 (1942).
7' BUCHEIT, supra note 70, at 229.
71 See previous text discussion on secession accompanying note 53-64 supra.
" See Friedlander, supra note 55, at 76, n.29; Mustafa, supra note 24, at 481.
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An important qualification on the right of self-determination deals
with the expiration of the right. A group under alien subjugation may not
have the present capacity to exercise its right of self-determination. The
creation of League of Nations Mandates and their division of non-self-
governing territories into A, B and C classes was a recognition of different
levels of capability to self-govern. Some territories were simply more po-
litically, economically and socially advanced than others - more capable
of exercising their self-determination right. Once established, though, the
right of self-determination cannot lapse. Rather, the international com-
munity must act as a Trustee or Mandatory over the group until it is
capable of fully exercising its right.7 5 Such was the case with the League
of Nations Mandates and is the essence of the United Nations Trustee-
ship system. But a group able to exercise a self-determination right may
lose such right upon failure to act. This failure to act subjectively sug-
gests that there is no will of the people, ergo no right of self-determina-
tion. A people unable to act, a people prevented from acting, finds its
right held for itself as a "sacred trust of civilization '76 until its capability
to act fully emerges.
The first paragraph of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples"7 suggests three final criteria
in evaluating the right of self-determination: the people must be a subju-
gated, territorially-based, colonial people. The terms are fairly clear and
easily understood. A subjugated people is one that is and has been denied
basic human rights. Thus the peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia were
subjugated people within the World War I context and both exercised
their self-determination right. Post-W.W.II saw the nations of Rwandi
and Burundi emerge from under the tutelage of Belgian U.N. Trustee-
ship.7 8 The right of self-determination exercised in the former territory of
Ruanda-Urundi caused the creation of these two states. Indeed, in apply-
ing modern self-determination principles to the American colonies, one
finds that even the colonists felt they were subjugated, their rights de-
nied, by a form of "taxation without representation."
The criterion that a people be territorially based is rather simplistic.
There must be some affinity between a land and a people in order for the
people to exercise its self-determination right. The recognized Palestinian
right of self-determination does not give the Palestinians a corollary right
to establish a political, social and cultural nation within the confines of
7' See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 126.
78 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 2.
77 Declaration on Colonial Peoples, supra note 27.
78 The plan for Ruanda-Urundi approved by the U.N. called for the formation of two
states joined by an ecnomic union. Note the similarity between the Ruanda-Urundi Plan
and the Partition Plan for Palestine, note 112 infra. Rigo SUREDA, supra note 42, at 168 n.8.
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New Jersey. The right may allow them to establish a self-determined na-
tion, federation or association within Palestine. The territory requirement
is thus a necessary objective characteristic to be considered in the deter-
mination of a people's self-determination right.
In brief summary, then, in order to invoke the self-determination
right, a "people must be a territory-based, organized community and
must be under alien subjugation." 9 The U.N. and general international
community, using both objective and subjective standards, makes deter-
minations of when it is ripe for a people to exercise rights of self-determi-
nation. When a people comprises a collective, non-secessionist group
which has been denied basic human rights and seeks, through various
means of enforcement, to secure these rights through the exercise of self-
determination, then ripeness attaches. Often though, the people them-
selves may pre-empt this international determination of their ripeness
such as in the case of Bangladesh.
Perhaps the colonial criterion presents the most confusion concern-
ing self-determination. Self-determination may be applicable to all non-
self-governing territories and not just to colonial territories. U.N. resolu-
tions, in particular, the 1960 Declaration of Colonial Peoples, 0 have gen-
erally spoken of the right of self-determination within a colonial context.
The astute observer might quickly inquire whether this basic principle of
self-determination is applicable to all non-self-governing territories, not
only the colonial ones. As this paper will indicate, the answer is crucial to
both an understanding of the principle of self-determination and to the
Palestinian claim to that right. A partial answer reveals that U.N. resolu-
tions concerning self-determination are often politically motivated and
generally premised upon the belief in the territorial integrity of states. It
was this concept of territorial integrity which resulted in the lack of U.N.
and worldwide support for the conflicts in Bangladesh,"' Nigeria (Bi-
afra)"2 and the Congo (Katanga).8s Each struggle was viewed as merely an
internal matter - a civil war against the sovereignty of a state. Only
Bangladesh, with large assistance from India, succeeded. Territorial in-
tegrity of the sovereign state, rather than the non-colonial nature of the
claimed rights of self-determination, was the controlling factor.
A more political and realistic examination of U.N. practice and world
history reveals that the U.N.'s preocccpation with self-determination of
79 OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 126.
80 Declaration on Colonial Peoples, supra note 27.
" See note 45, supra.
82 Biafra's self-determination claim was recognized by only five states. See Ljalye, Was
"Biafra" at Any Time a State in International Law, 65 AM.J.INT'L L. 551, 553-54 (1971).
83 The .Katangan claim of self-determination was met by U.N. organized opposition.
See L. MILLER, WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER 66-116 (1967).
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colonial territories has resulted from the post-W.W.II anti-colonial era.
Though self-determination is a right belonging to all peoples, the U.N.
has been mainly confronted with a deluge of self-determination claims
from overseas colonies of European powers. 4 Thus, the U.N.'s replies
have been confined to colonial situations. Two non-colonial situations re-
veal the universal applications of self-determination to all peoples. U.N.
resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1005 (ES-Il) supported the self-determina-
tion right of the Hungarian people during the 1956 revolution. 5 The vari-
ous resolutions supporting the political, economic and cultural self-deter-
mination rights of the Palestinian people, a non-colonial people, also
evidence the universal application of the right.8
Thus, although political events have concentrated the United Na-
tion's focus on colonial territories and the U.N. stands firm on the con-
cept of territorial integrity, the principle of self-determination should not
be considered strictly a colonial right. The right of self-determination im-
plied in Article 22 of the League of Nations Convenant speaks of colonies
and territories formerly under alien subjugation.8 7 The International
Court of Justice in both its 1971 SouthWest Africa (Namibia) and 1975
Western Sahara opinions, emphasized the applicability of self-determina-
tion to all non-self-governing territories.8 8 Therefore, self-determination
is and should be considered, an inherent right of all peoples-colonial as
well as non-colonial. To deny this is to suggest that non-colonial peoples
have no right of self-determination. Such a theory runs counter to the
very nature of self-determination.
E. Types of Self-Determination
The examination of self-determination problems concludes with an
analysis of the various types of self-determination. Self-determination
should always be viewed as a continuing process of refining political, eco-
nomic and cultural development. However, a final step in the transition
from "people" to "nation" is the selection of the means by which the peo-
ple's self-determination goals may be achieved.
Most individuals upon hearing the word "self-determination" assume
84 OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 12, at 127.
8' Id. at 128.
See notes 68-69 supra.
17 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1, refers "To those colonies and territo-
ries which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the
states which formerly governed them.. ." [emphasis added].
88 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(SouthWest Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, [1971] I.C.J. 16; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975]
I.C.J. 12.
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that self-determination equals independence. However, such an equation,
in light of the number of colonial peoples achieving independence after
W.W. II, while not unreasonable is a wrong equation. Self-determination
means more than independence. As a political structure, it may also take
the form of an association, federation or merger. An informed observer
commented that "most contemporary self-determination conflicts proba-
bly could be settled more easily if a political status other than indepen-
dence were proferred by one of the parties."8 9 It is these other political
arrangements which should now be explored.
As early as 1952 the General Assembly noted that a territory had
three options to attain self-government: independence, "other separate
systems of self-government," or free association." More recently, the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations affirmed that self-determination may
be expressed through independence, free association or any other freely
determined political status.9 1 The concepts of independence and associa-
tion, as with merger and federation, are more easily understood through
an example than by definition. Thus Mexico, France and Japan are inde-
pendent countries owing allegiance only to themselves. Ohio, Connecticut
and the other forty-eight states form an association; an association of
united states. Allegiance is owed not only to the individual states but also
to the greater whole, the United States. A merger occurs when a people
agree to be assimilated into another nation, as when the Republic of the
Seven Ionian Islands merged with Greece in 1864."' Lastly, a federation,
such as exists in Switzerland, joins together people of different languages,
cultures and religions into one nation acting for the common good.
In its 1975 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, the International
Court of Justice also recognized that self-determination could be achieved
not only by independence. Free association and integration or merger
were also possible." Treatise writers generally accept these expressions of
self-determination and even propose other, more original forms such as
an autonomous regime located within a state.9 4 Perhaps Lesotho, located
entirely within the Union of South Africa, is an example of such a regime.
Certainly, the very existence of different forms by which self-determina-
tion is expressed in the world today is a sign of their viability as political,
economic and cultural structures.
The Swiss federation, as a model of self-determination, and in terms
89 Note, supra note 24, at 161.
0o G.A. Res. 648, supra note 67.
9' Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 29.
92 Sijtholf-Leyden, The Right of Self-Determination, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN His-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 327 (J. Verzijl 1962).
:3 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, supra note 33.
9' See Sijtholf-Leyden, supra note 92, at 324.
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of Middle East applicability, is perhaps the most interesting structure. To
be effective, a federation must not only meet its people's needs but it
must also ensure that fundamental self-determination rights are not
trammeled. Switzerland, as with Canada and its Quebec Province, is
multi-national, multi-lingual and multi-cultural. Despite these cross-cut-
ting cleavages, the nation has been able to avoid involvement in both
World Wars and stands as a bastion of neutrality in a world of power
struggles. Moreover, one observer suggests that the adoption of a similar
shared-sovereignty system between the Palestinians and Jews could fun-
nel the billions expended on war and defense into mutually beneficial cul-
tural, social and economic projects.95 The feasibility of such a system is
hampered by the fact that the Palestinian people are not easily defined;
not totally concentrated. It is this system, its possible applicability as a
self-determination model for the people of Palestine which must now be
addressed.
IV. THE LAND AND PROPLES OF PALESTINE
A. History and Historic Right
Palestine, as used in this paper, is bounded on the West by the Medi-
terranean Sea. Its Northern boundary begins at Mt. Hermon and gener-
ally follows the present Israel-Lebanon border to the sea. The Golan
Heights signal the easternmost extent of Palestine's border. This border
then follows the Jordan River, continues through the Dead Sea and con-
cludes at Aquaba. Proceeding westward, Palestine's southern boundary
extends from the Gulf of Aquaba to a point on the Mediterranean Sea
approximately six or seven miles southwest of the Gaza Strip town of
Khan Yuris.9 Broader definitions might include parts of Syria and Leba-
non but for this note's purpose, the above boundaries will suffice. In es-
sence, the "Palestine" envisioned in this paper is a convenient, workable
Palestine - convenient in that it generally adheres to the 1967 cease fire
line and workable in that it includes large segments of the Palestinian
population.
The history of settlement in Palestine is obscure. Both Jews and Pal-
estinian Arabs claim an existence in Palestine since earliest recorded his-
tory. Specifically, many Jews firmly hold that their patriarch, Abraham,
first settled the area around 1800 B.C.9 7 Palestinians claim the Canan-
95 Peretz, A Binational Approach to the Palestine Conflict, 33 LAW CONTEMP. PROB. 32,
38 (1968).
so Comment, supra note 13, at 458, describes the Mandatory's definition of Palestine's
geographic borders.
97 See F. EPP, WHOSE LAND IS PALESTINE 30 (1970).
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nites as their ancestors and date their occupation of Palestine as around
3000 B.C.-approximately 1200 years before Abraham, yet 4000 years af-
ter the existence of the walled city of Jericho (7000 B.C.).98 King David
established the first Jewish kingdom in Palestine in 1000 B.C., but 922
B.C. saw the kingdom split into two kingdoms: Israel and Judah. Israel
was destroyed by the Assyrians in 721 B.C. and Judah by the Babyloni-
ans in 587 B.C. and both its peoples were carried away. Subsequently,
Palestine became the subject of pagan, Christian and Moslem rule until
the advent of the twentieth century. Its twentieth century history is well
known and will be the subject of later discussion.
The prior history serves to focus attention on the Zionist position
that Jews have a historic right to Palestine.9 9 The concept of historic
right suggests that Palestine is the Jewish homeland upon which the Jew-
ish people can exercise their right of self-determination. While Palestine
may indeed serve as the center for Jewish culture and religion, estab-
lished history reveals that consolidated Jewish rule lasted only 400 years,
1000 B.C. to 587 B.C.100 Indeed, from 587 B.C. to 538 B.C. and after an
anti-Roman uprising in 132 A.D., Jews were dispersed and deported from
Palestine."' As Henry Cattan observes, "For nineteen centuries the Jews
had almost ceased to exist in Palestine.' '0 2
A general history of non-rule and non-habitation cannot serve as the
basis for a historic right claim to a homeland. International law and inter-
national stability cannot condone the acceptance of the historic right con-
cept. The term is disruptive, dangerous, and a threat to world peace. Jew-
ish rule in Palestine approximately equaled Roman rule in England.
Acceptance of a principle of historic right might thus lead present-day
Romans to lay claim to Big Ben, Parliament and Dover's White Cliffs.
98 CATTAN, supra note 3, at 3.
9 The Zionist Organization, in a February 3, 1919 memorandum to the Supreme Coun-
cil of the Allied Powers, called for a recognition of "the historic title of the Jewish people to
Palestine.. ." Quoted in HUREWITZ, 2 DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 45 (1956).
Balanced against this claim is Lord Sydenham's 1922 observation: "If we are going to admit
claims based on conquest thousands of years ago, the whole world will have to be turned
upside down." 50 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1021 (1922).
"I The Maccabean uprising in 168 BC brought about the creation of a politically unsta-
ble Jewish Kingdom in 166 BC. Roman conquest ended Jewish reign in 63 BC. For more
complete historical descriptions, see, J. BRIGHT, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL (2d ed. 1972); F.
KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI: DILEMMA 1-2 (1968), CATrAN, supra note 3, at 4-5. A chronologi-
cal history of dominion over Jerusalem is provided by Reverend Charles T. Bridgeman's
Letter to the President of the Trusteeship Council, Jan. 13, 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
9) 15, U.N. Doc. A/1286 (1950); see also KHOURI, supra, at 475 ff.
101 Many works deal with the Jewish diaspora or expulsion from Palestine. For chrono-
logical purposes, see KHOURI, supra note 100, at 2; BRIGHT, supra note 100; H. CATAN,
PALESTINE, THE ARABS & ISRAEL 2 (1969).
1.2 CATrAN, supra note 3, at 5.
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This thought alone should be enough to provide the historic right concept
with a justly-deserved burial.
B. Balfour and the Mandate
Theodore Herzl, the father of political Zionism, commenced work in
1896 with other Zionists toward the goal of obtaining recognition of the
Jew's right to establish a state in Palestine. This goal was largely fulfilled,
and Zionism greatly strengthened, by the publication of the Balfour Dec-
laration in 1917.13 This declaration was actually a letter written by the
British Foreign Minister, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Rothschild.
Sympathizing with Zionist aspirations, the letter clearly indicates British
support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people." This pledge of support evokes a number of questions.
What was the motive behind the statement? What is meant by "national
home?"
The document refers not to a "state" or "the" national home; it de-
picts only "a" national home. The wording is significant for it gained
needed Jewish support for the Allies and left Great Britain free to later
interpret the ambiguous phrase. These interpretations began with the
Churchill White Papers of 1922. This policy statement recognized the
Jews' historic connection with Palestine-a shaky support at best-and
noted that Palestine was not to be transformed into a Jewish home.
Rather, a Jewish home was to be established in Palestine.10' Also in 1922,
the British House of Lords expressed its wariness of and dissatisfaction
with the Balfour Declaration. On June 21, 1922 the House voted sixty to
twenty-nine against the proposed incorporation of the Balfour Declara-
tion in the Palestinian Mandate.105 In 1937, Lord Peel headed a British
Commission to investigate Palestinian riots. The Commission's report off-
113 Curiously enough, the Balfour Declaration was written on November 2, 1917 when
the Turkish Ottoman Empire, not Great Britain, ruled Palestine. The full text is reproduced
below:
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government,
the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has
been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facili-
tate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the
knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Balfour Declaration, reprinted in CATrAN, supra note 3, at 11.
,0' GREAT BRITAIN, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, CMID. No. 1700 (1922).
1"5 50 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1034 (1922).
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handedly noted that the Balfour Declaration had been published prima-
rily to curry Jewish sympathy and support for the Allies' war effort. 06
And in 1939, the MacDonald White Papers10 7 echoed the acknowledge-
ment that the Balfour Declaration had been merely a political move. The
White Papers emphasized the creation within ten years of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state to be governed jointly by the Arabs and Jews.
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant set up a mandate sys-
tem which recognized that certain territories and colonies incapable of
self-rule should be placed under the tutelage of more advanced nations.
Section 1 of Article 22 provided that" . . . peoples not yet able to stand
by themselves . . . form a sacred trust of civilization." Section 4 observes
that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration
in the selection of the Mandatory." Objectively and subjectively, the Arti-
cle thus impliedly recognizes the right of self-determination. Section 4
also provisionally recognizes the independent status of certain highly de-
veloped communities. Palestine was classified as such a community.
These Class A mandated communities needed only "administrative ad-
vice and assistance . . . until such time as they (were) able to stand
alone." Hence, during the mandate, British-administered Palestine had a
flag as well as executive, judicial and legislative bodies. "In effect, with
the exception of carrying on its own foreign affairs and of being subject to
internal limitations . . .Palestine was seized of all the indicia of a na-
tional state."'10 8 The recognition in Article 2, section 4 of the provisionally
independent status of Palestine was therefore more fact than verbiage.
A brief summary shows Herzl's hoped-for Balfour Declaration some-
what watered down by the White Papers of 1922 and 1939. As the White
Papers note, Great Britain's aim as Mandatory was not to establish Pal-
estine as a Jewish state, nor to choose between Arab and Jew, but rather
to merge both groups politically into an independent state of Palestine.
The realization of this goal was ended with the creation of the State of
Israel. Its death knell, however, was sounded by intransigence, social un-
rest and a plan of partition.
C. Partition Plan, 1948 and Beyond
Wise King Solomon once proposed halving a child in order to satisfy
two claimant mothers. Horrified, the true mother spoke against the plan
and offered the child to the false mother. Recognizing these maternal in-
10' See Commission Report in Lyrique, Motives Behind the Balfour Declaration, in
PALESTINE: JEWISH HOMELAND 116 (J. Johnsen ed. 1946).
107 GREAT BRITAIN, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, CMD. No. 6019 (1939).
10. Comment, The Palestinian 4fJ#444 People and Their Political, Military and Le-
gal Status in the World Community, 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 326, 328 (1974).
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stincts, Solomon then awarded the child to the true mother. Solomon also
recognized that halving the child would cause its death. Unfortunately,
Solomon's wisdom was lost upon Great Britain, the League of Nations
and the U.N. when they proposed the partitioning of Palestine. A dispute
might be temporarily solved but the death of a child - of a people -
would be the price.
The 1936 Peel Commission investigated disturbances in Palestine
and concluded that Jewish-Arab self-determination rights would best be
respected and Jewish-Arab conflicts best eliminated, by partitioning Pal-
estine.109 Northern and Western Palestine would become a Jewish state
while much of the remainder would be incorporated into Arab Trans-Jor-
dan. °10 Other proposals recommended different geographical dissections,
or a federation or even no partition at all. 1 The partition plan finally
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on November 29, 1947 proposed
the creation of separate but economically unified Arab and Jewish
states." 2 Under this plan a surprising 57% of Palestine was allocated to
the Jewish state. The figure is surprising in terms of prior land distribu-
tion among Arabs and Jews. United Nations 1947 land ownership statis-
tics reveal that Jews owned only 5.66%, Arabs owned 47.77% and the
government possessed the remaining land in Palestine. 3 These statistics
disclose that Jews constituted a minority of the population in Palestine
and they owned a minority of the land. In essence, the partition plan
delegated to a land-holding minority of the population, a majority of the
benefits.
Palestine's history following the Partition Plan is well-known and
needs little recitation here. Israel proclaimed its existence as a state in
May, 1948. Large and costly wars between Israel and her Arab neighbors
109 GREAT BRITAIN, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, CMD. No. 5479 (1937); See GREAT BRITAIN,
THE POLITIcAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 23 (1947).
110 Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine allowed the Mandatory to withhold applica-
tion of the Mandate's provisions to the area known as Trans-Jordan. GREAT BRITAIN, PAR-
LIAMENTARY PAPERS, CMD. No. 1785 (1923). A September 16, 1922 British Memorandum to
the League of Nation Council sought and received League approval to withhold the applica-
bility of the Mandate's Jewish national home provisions to Trans-Jordan. 3 LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS O.J. 1188-89, 1390-91 (1922).
I See the various proposals of the Woodhead Commission (1938) in GREAT BRITAIN,
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 25-26 (1947).
112 G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131 (1947). Interestingly enough, one U.N. Sub-
committee rejected the Partition Plan on grounds that it was "contrary to the specific provi-
sions of the Mandate and in direct violation of the principles and objectives of the Cove-
nant." Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestiniap Question, 2
U.N. GAOR (23d mtg. of the Comm.) 270, 278, U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 14/32 (1947).
113 CATTAN, supra note 3, at 55 n. 55-56. Other statistics suggest that Jewish land own-
ership amounted to 7%; see Chapple, Jewish Land Settlement in Palestine, in W. KHALIDI,
FROM HEAVEN TO CONQUEST 841-843 app (1971).
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occurred in 1948, 1956 (Suez crisis), 1967 and 1973. Recent history has
witnessed the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This note's
purpose, however, is not to recount the history of Palestine. Rather, the
above cursory historical sketch serves as a necessary background to a
proper understanding and examination of the Arabs of Palestine - here-
inafter, the "Palestinians" - the new Jews of the Modern world.
D. The Palestinians
Who are these mysterious Palestinians? All too often, the reader as-
sociates "Palestinians" with "terrorists" and envisions air hijackings,
guerrilla warfare and the Munich Olympics. However, as noted by an Is-
raeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, "the Palestinian community in general
must in no way be equated with the terrorist organizations. '114 Yet the
automatic association of "terrorist" with "Palestinian" continues. Per-
haps the word "prejudice" most accurately describes these views. For
prejudice, in its simplest components, occurs when one prejudges a person
or people without truly knowing this person or people. This lack of
knowledge, this ignorance, can only be eradicated by learning, by acquir-
ing knowledge of the Palestinian identity.
The Moslem invaders of Palestine in 637 A.D. were not the first fore-
fathers of present-day Palestinians but merely served to supplement an
already established people. Prior Christian and pagan rulers also added to
the Palestinian people. Mostly though, "the Palestinians of today are the
descendants of the Philistines, the Canaanites and other early tribes
which inhabited the country ... since the dawn of history. Their settle-
ment in Palestine can be traced back at least 40 centuries." 1 5 Many have
raised doubts, though especially in a self-determination context, about
the existence of a Palestinian identity. It has been widely claimed, and at
times rightfully so, that "for the Arab[s], Palestine is (simply) a geo-
graphic fact."' 16 Hence, voices are heard proclaiming that the Palestini-
ans are more Pan-Arabic than Palestinian and are tied not to one another
but to individual plots of land. Despite these claims, many Palestinian
Arabs do in fact think of themselves as Palestinians. 17 Palestinians do
have a Palestinian identity: they have not, though, reached a high level of
"national consciousness."
A brief historical jump backwards may further explain the distinc-
114 Address by Yigal Alon (Oct. 3, 1974), excerpted in Allon, On a Palestine Identity,
in THE PALESTINIANS 181 (M. Curtis, J. Neyer, C. Waxman, A. Pollack, eds. 1975 [hereinaf-
ter The Palestinians]).
CATTAN, supra note 3, at 7.
11 Syrkin, The Arab Refugees: A Zionist View, COMMENTARY, January 1966, at 28.
11M See the population study done by, Tessler, Israel's Arabs and the Palestinian Prob-
lem, 31 MIDDLE EAST J. 313 (1977).
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tion between a Palestinian identity and a national consciousness. In 1920,
a Muslim-Christian Association, formed "to protest the establishment of
the Jewish national home,'11s met in Haifa and called for the creation of
a separate Arab nation composed of all the residents of Palestine. This
conference was instrumental in creating a Palestinian identity, a sense of
communality among the Arabs of Palestine. The 1920's and 1930's saw
frequent Arab revolts against Jews and British rule. Despite these attacks
and despite a general Arab invasion and war in 1948, Israel was creited
and survived. Most literature examining the late 1930's and 1940's in Pal-
estine recognizes that after the failure of the 1936-1939 Arab uprisings,
talk of Palestinian nationalism virtually disappeared. Apparently even
though ideas of national consciousness were, perhaps, not yet ripe, the
notion of a Palestinian identity-a sense of belonging to Palestine-did
indeed exist. A Palestinian identity has existed for many years but the
emergence of a subjective national consciousness has appeared only'
sporadically.
The importance of identifying a Palestinian people is a fundamental
necessity for a self-determination claim. For in applying self-determina-
tion concepts to the Palestinians, it must be established that the Pales-
tinians are a collective, subjugated people sharing similar racial, religious,
historical and cultural characteristics. Factors surrounding Israel's crea-
tion are often proffered as evidence of the lack of a Palestinian identity,
national consciousness, or people entitled to exercise a self-determination
right. Thus, Arab states and Israel accepted a U.N. plan on May 12, 1949
which called for a territorial settlement similar to that proposed by the
Partition Plan.119 Though eventually repudiated, the plan's significance is
that the Arab states - and not the Palestinians - accepted a plan to
determine the status of Palestine. To some this might suggest the lack of
a Palestinian identity. A more realistic viewing will acknowledge that
Palestinians simply lacked representative capacity to act as a people
under the 1949 plan.
A larger factor surrounding a Palestinian identity concerns the Pales-
tinian exodus after Israel's creation and the doctrine of extinctive pre-
scription. The debate surrounding the 1948 Palestinian exodus centers on
competing claims of "free choice" versus "expulsion." For instance, on
April 9, 1948 a joint Irgun-Stern gang (Israeli "terrorists" or "freedom
fighters") entered the Palestinian Arab town of Deir Yassin and killed
254 Arabs. A state of panic broke out among Palestinians and thousands
"8 Epp, supra note 97, at 143.
21 The plan was substantially similar to the Partition Plan. Third Progress Report of
the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 4 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. (927th mtg), 2
Annexes (Agenda Item 18) 5, 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/927 (1949).
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fled from the soon-to-be created state of Israel. 120 Why did they flee?
Some claim that Arab states urged the Palestinians to leave so as to focus
world opinion on the Arab side against alleged Israeli aggressors. Yet a
study of Arab newspapers, radio broadcasts and Arab League minutes
reveals no evidence to support this proposition. 121 More likely, the Pales-
tinians fled because, as James Parkes has observed, the rank and file
Palestinians had no leaders since the very concept of Jewish state had
earlier caused many middle and professional, class Palestinians to flee;
many simply lacked the training to defend their homes; and that many
were quite used to temporarily fleeing stronger adversaries. 122 The ques-
tion truly became "to flee or not to flee." Those who did leave and Pales-
tinians in general, have found their self-determination claim questioned
on the grounds of extinctive prescription.
The doctrine of extinctive prescription is similar to the property law
concept of adverse possession; both are means of acquiring or losing title
over territory. Prescription, specifically extinctive prescription, holds that
a claim to a territory is lost if not advanced within a reasonable time
period. This loss is conditioned upon the "peaceful and uninterrupted
reign by an occupying power in place of the legal sovereign. 1 23 The claim
is thus made that the Palestinians, by failing to exercise their self-deter-
mination right in 1948, lost legal title to Palestine.22 Logically, the next
step would be to conclude that no right of self-determination exists be-
cause there is no land upon which to exercise this right. The argument is
an illusory one. A prime necessity of the extinctive prescription doctrine
is that of a "peaceful and uninterrupted" foreign reign over the land.
Israel's existence and reign has been far from peaceful and uninterrupted.
Its claim of legal title has been constantly challenged by Palestinians and
other Arab nations. Without "proof of actual consent to territorial
claim,"'2 5 the doctrine of extinctive prescription cannot apply.
Our examination of the Palestinian people has revealed the existence
of an Arab, generally Moslem, people sharing a long, documented:.history
of residency in Palestine. Factors such as the Palestinian exodus, the
Arab states' acceptance of a 1949 territorial plan and the concept of ex-
tinctive prescription have led to a questioning of the existence of a Pales-
tinian identity and national consciousness. Though a subjective Palestin-
120 See Epp, supra note 97, at 187. Estimates of the number of 1948 Palestinian refu-
gees range from 590,000 to one million; Compare Prittie, Middle East Refugees, in The
Palestinians, supra note 114, at 52, with CATTAN, supra note 3, at 103.
121 J. DAVIS, THE EVASIVE PEACE 56 (1968).
122 J. PARKES, WHOSE LAND: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLES OF PALESTINE 304 (1970).
123 Note, Israel: Conqueror, Liberator or Occupier Within the Context of International
Law, 7 SW. U.L. REV. 206, 209 (1975).
124 Id. at 227.
125 D. O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 424 (2d ed. 1970).
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ian identity has been established,126 a true national consciousness has just
emerged from formative stages. This national consciousness, labeled
Palestianism, emerged from the creation of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) in 1964.
The PLO is to Palestianism what the Zionist Organization was to Zi-
onism. Both movements have represented the desires of a relatively pow-
erless and partially homeless people in search of their sovereignty. Both
have approved of terriorism as a legitimate force to aid the advancement
of their goals.127 Both have revolted against the present while using his-
torical justifications for their claims, i.e., "We were here first." The differ-
ence between the two, put simply, is that Zionists now have their state,
Israel, while the Palestinians do not. As Sholomo Avineri observes, "The
PLO, which Arafat leads, is somewhat like what the Zionist Organization
used to be. It is a quasi-state in the making: it is not yet a state."128 As
movements, Zionism is both a political and social movement whereas
Palestinianism, traditionally a political movement, is just beginning to in-
corporate a social praxis comparable to Zionism. As Palestinians become
more aware of a national consciousness, this social praxis will grow. The
West Bank elections in 1976 evidenced this emerging national conscious-
ness. Pro-PLO mayors were overwhelmingly swept into office. However,
in reflecting their constituents' views, many mayors supported the PLO
not for its activities but because it was the. only recognized Palestinian
spokesperson.
The Palestinians, then, are recognized as a collective people sharing
similar objective characteristics and who are subjectively attempting to
assert a self-determination right in Palestine through an internationally
recognized spokesperson, the PLO. Their right of self-determination has
been recognized in the Mandate, the Partition Plan and by various U.N.
resolutions."2 Though the self-determination right has found a niche
mainly with colonial territories, previous discussion notes both the acci-
dental and contradictory nature of limiting the right to colonies. Yet in
practice, the Palestinians remain the "one case in which the rule restrict-
ing self-determination to colonial peoples has not been followed by the
U.N.,,,so
121 See Tessler, supra note 117.
" Palestinian national liberation or guerrilla raids and air hijackings are well known
and well documented; see Palestinian Arab Terrorist Acts (1968-1974), in The Palestinians,
supra note 114, at 260 app. Similarly, the attack on Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948 (see text at
note 168) and the bombing of the King David Hotel on July 22, 1946 by Zionist gangs (Irgun
and Stern) are seen as either terrorist attacks or preemptive strikes by national liberation
fighters.
128 S. AVINERI, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 132 (1971).
129 See notes 68-69, 110, 112 supra.
130 Schoenberg, supra note 22, at 102.
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An examination of the Palestinians would be incomplete were it not
to include an analysis of self-determination modes best suited to achieve
Palestinian self-determination. The first mode, complete independence, is
an unacceptable choice. An independent Palestinian state within the con-
fines of Palestine would face tremendous difficulties. For instance, a West
Bank-Gaza Strip state, might seem natural in light of the number of
Palestinians in each location. To ensure an outlet to the Mediterranean
Sea, a road would have to be built through Israeli territory from Gaza to
the West Bank (possibly to Hebron). Such a road would present the same
problems as the. road through East Germany to Berlin - in general, a
hapless solution and situation. Moreover, great economic assistance
"would have to be provided by Saudi Arabia and the other petroleum-
rich principalities of the Persian Gulf. "' Although the fertile West Bank
might provide many necessary foodstuffs and highly educated Palestini-
ans would provide the technical capacity to run the state, the very real
possibility exists that the state would become nothing more than an edo-
nomic Israeli Bantustan-a source of export and cheap labor. The intri-
cately entwined economies of Israel and the Gaza-West Bank areas attest
to this observation. Thus, "two separate exclusionist national entities
can't provide a satisfactory basis for long-term peace."'3 2
A merger of the Palestinians into the state of Israel is also unaccept-
able as past history evidences. During the Mandate, constant uprisings
and battles occurred between Jews and Palestinians and old wounds leave
deep scars. Aside from the hatred and mistrust, a basic social-cultural
problem exists. Israel is a "Western-oriented European nation" whereas
the Palestinians are still a largely rural, "peasant community, more of
Asia than of West."'' 3 A final problem is a statistical one. If the approxi-
mately one million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were added
to the one-half million Palestinians in Israel (total, 1.5 million), the Pales-
tinian population in 1993, at a four percent annual growth rate, would be
forty-six percent of the total population west of the Jordan River. s'3 This
figure, of course, does not even include the other estimated 2.5 million
Palestinians living elsewhere! The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian
merger are dim; the very idea, as history reveals, is unworkable and
frightening.
In light of the number of Palestinians living in Jordan,"35 a Jordan-
'31 Sheehan, A Proposal for a Palestinian State, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1977, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 9.
131 Agha, What State for the Palestinians, 6 J. PALESTINE STUD. 39 (1976).
,33 Peretz, supra note 95, at 36-37.
,' Data taken from, Monroe, The West Bank: Palestinian or Israeli, 31 MIDDLE EAST
J. 408 (1977).
'35 Prittie, supra note 120, at 70, estimates that 40% of all Palestinians live in Jordan.
Prittie, Israel and the Palestinian Question, in The Palestinians, supra note 114 at 122,
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West Bank merger might seem a natural solution to the Palestinian prob-
lem. Two factors, Israel's reluctance to give up the West Bank and King
Hussein's possible unwillingness to accept thousands more into an al-
ready burdened Jordanian economy, militate against this suggestion.
However, an association with Jordan or Israel are distinct possibilities.
Due to similar ethnic, cultural, and social ties an association with Jordan
would appear more feasible. Either association, however, presents
problems of divided loyalty between state and nation and federalism as
opposed to states' rights. The need for a firm solution in Palestine calls
for a self-determination model with few inherent problems. The United
States, a different place at a different time, was effectively able to estab-
lish such an association. An association for the Palestinians, with due re-
gard for prior history, would present inherent difficulties of divided loy-
alty and federalism.
The earlier suggested Swiss-federation approach to the Palestinian
problem appears to be the most attractive and feasible mode of self-de-
termination. The Swiss system has generally avoided World Wars and in-
ternal struggles. "Under the Swiss system, governmental powers are di-
vided or shared by federal authorities and twenty-three cantons which
make up the Swiss federation." 13 6 Yet, cultural, linguistic and religious
differences flourish. It is this system, a system of divergent peoples and
cultures, which is best suited for a Palestinian model of self-determina-
tion. A federation would focus Palestinian loyalties upon a Palestinian
state federated with either or both Israel and Jordan. Palestinians, as a
people, would effectively be able to voice views concerning the Palestine-
Trans-Jordan area and still retain a share of national identity and con-
sciousness. Joint economic, educational and possibly military programs
might evolve from this federation without destroying this Palestinian
consciousness. Objectively the people would remain Palestinian and sub-
jectively their will would be expressed.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing presentation has described the evolutionary stage of
self-determination: from theory to principle and ultimately, to right. Self-
determination has moved beyond the nationalistic strains of the nine-
teenth century or Hitler's Germany. Today, the "right" of self-determina-
tion cannot lapse; it inherently belongs to a collective people sharing sim-
ilar objective characteristics such as race, culture, history, religion and
language. This group must objectively see itself as a people; a people
further notes that in 1974, 60% (12 of 20) of Jordan's Ministers were Palestinians. See Key
to a Wider Peace, TmE, April 14, 1980, at 50.
136 Peretz, supra note 95, at 38 n. 20.
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whose basic rights - especially that of self-determination - have been
denied by subjugation by a foreign power. Self-determination, expressed
by independence, association, merger or federation, allows this people *to
choose its form of political government while further pursuing economic,
social and cultural development. Realpolitik considerations suggest, how-
ever, that the implementation and enforcement of this right may be
achieved only by military muscle. For it is realpolitic international law
which determines which groups are peoples and when these peoples are
ready to exercise a self-determination right. International acceptance of
Ruanda and Burundi, and rejection of self-determination claims in Nige-
ria and the Congo, attest to these realpolitik conclusions. The suffering
and misery of Bangladesh stand as an example of what international sup-
port means for self-determination claims.
World Wars I and II serve as a constant reminder of a basic reason
for international acceptance of the right of self-determination: survival.
Thus, while the raison d'etre of self-determination may be couched in the
belief that all people must be allowed to freely determine their political,
economic and cultural status, an underlying rationale is survival. "Sur-
vival" is not used in the Darwinian sense but rather as a means of empha-
sizing the peace-promoting aspects of self-determination. "World" wars
are now a reality. Allowing a people to freely self-determine their status
may promote peace and ensure survival by lessening the chance that a
Third World War - a true "war to end all wars" - will occur. Beliefs in
basic democratic principles have thus joined hands with the practical re-
alities of modern life.
The Palestinians, as a collective, objectively similar people, must be
allowed to exercise their right of self-determination despite the fact that
the creation of some type of Palestinian state might create problems for
Israel. A true support base might be established for Palestinian fedayeen
raids on Israel and the creation of a Palestinian State might further the
development of Pan-Arabic sentiments among Arab nations. These
problems, however, are beyond the scope of the present inquiry. One
problem that must be examined is Israel's fear that a PLO-Yasir Arafat
led state would eventually attempt to live up to its charter's promise to
drive the Jews into the sea. 13
Two reasons seem to preclude Arafat or a radical leader from accom-
plishing that objective. As Frank Epp notes, "it is a historical truism that
an underground movement, once it assumes formal political power, tends
to become responsible, and respectable, in the exercise of authority."'38
Thus, the new leadership's focus, even Arafat's would be turned inward to
117 For an interesting analysis of the arguments against a Palestinian state, see Key to a
Wider Peace, supra note 135, at 50.
I'l Epp, supra note 97, at 152.
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domestic problems facing the state and not toward Israel. Secondly, it is
doubtful that some Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt,
could tolerate a radical leader. The new state, in whatever self-determina-
tion mode, would be in desperate need of Arab petro dollars. The Arab
leaders could not afford having a radical Palestinian leader stirring up
populations with nationalistic ideas or causing a war which might result
in great oil revenue losses. Thus money, or lack thereof, might cause the
emergence of a moderate Palestinian regime. However, Ayatollah Ruhol-
lah Khomeini's rise to power in Iran in 1979, the "students'" seige of the
American Embassy, and the 200-plus day detainment of Embassy person-
nel, suggest that even the above concepts are subject to question.
Problems exist with the creation of any new state or political entity.
Internal ripples are felt throughout the international community.
Problems, though, can be solved. The Palestinian problem must be solved
for the sake of the Palestinian people and Middle East peace. The Pales-
tinians must be allowed to exercise their self-determination right, for, as
David Ben-Gurion observed, the creation of "serious difficulties for us
... is not a reason to deny their rights."' 39
139 Ben Gurion, supra note 1.
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